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PREFACE

This thesis considers the changes in United States
relations with the Soviet Union after World War II.

In

discussing the major events which shaped the changes in
policy, I have not addressed the details of the events
themselves,
volume.

since each in itself is worthy of a complete,

Instead, I have limited my discussion to the broad

indicators of diplomatic policy changes which resulted from
the events.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, head of the University of Omaha
History Department and to his associate, Dr. Paul L. Becko
Seminar courses in historic research conducted by
Dr. Trickett, in which I was fortunate enough to be enrolled
for three semesters, provided me with the necessary basic
guidelines and techniques upon which to proceed with this
thesis.

For the thesis paper itself, Dr. Beck has rendered

many hours of detailed perusal, assistance, and advice as
the paper has progressed from draft to format for Submission
to the University.
most appreciative.

For his criticisms and critiques, I am
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INTRODUCTION

During World War II, when it became apparent
that Germany would attack Russia, both Prime Minister
Churchill and President Roosevelt were inclined to
welcome full cooperation with Russia.

Churchill

remarked on June 21, 1941, that "If Hitler invaded Hell
I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil
1
in the House of Commons."’ In actuality much more, than
a "favorable reference" was forthcoming.

A massive

program of military aid was promised and delivered by
2
both the United States and Britian,
and of equal
importance, a three poWer military alliance was formed
1
Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 370.
2
General Augustin Guillaume, Soviet Arms and Soviet
Power (Washington:
Infantry Journal Press, 1949), pp. 90-91.
Aid from the United States was governed by the Lend-Lease
Agreement, concluded on June 11, 1942. The material furnished
from the end of 1942 on under this agreement totalled
17,500,000 tons, or 2,600 shiploads of all types of war mak
ing vehicles as well as basic essentials for life sustenance.
England furnished 3,800 tanks, 6,800 aircraft and 2,000 tons
of copper.

2

to combat the Nazis from three directions.

Churchill reflected

the feelings of his nation when he said in December,

1941:

...the glorious steadfastness and energy with
which they /the Russian Armies7 have resisted
...have now been made plain...We must faith
fully and punctually fulfill the very serious
undertakings we have made to Russia...^
' Both the United States and England's undertakings
proved successful; consequently, by 1943 it became obvious
that victory in the war must ultimately rest with the Allies.
Therefore, in November 1943 the leaders of the Big Three met
at Teheran, and for the first time, seriously discussed postwar
policies and problems.

A cooperative tendency among the

leaders, which had been established during the three trying
years of combat against a common enemy, was still prevalent
at Teheran and led to general agreements regarding postwar
problems, particularly that of the establishment of a United
4
Nations.

As a finale, the Big Three stated that "We came

here with hope and determination.

We leave here friends in

3
Winston S. Churchill, The Unrelenting Struggle
(Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1942), pp. 345-346.
4
p. 409.

State Department Bulletin, Vol IX, December 1, 1943,

3

5
fact, in spirit and in purpose."
The "spirit of Teheran" persisted among the Big
Three during 1944.

As allied armies closed on Germany from

east and west, there was a general feeling of acceptance in
England and the United States for Uncle Joe Stalin and the
glorious Red Army.

6

Yet by the beginning of 1945 a feeling of apprehen
sion was developing regarding Russia's intentions in the
' postwar world.

Roosevelt remarked in his annual message to

Congress on January 6, 1945, that "the nearer we come to
vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become
conscious of differences among victors."

7

5
*
Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers-, 1946) , p. 113. Possibly a
hint of a future, in which Russia would respect only force,
was rendered by Stalin in an argument with Churchill.
The
English Prime Minister had quoted an opinion of the Pope on
the particular subject. Stalin merely replied:
"How many
divisions has he got?" See James F. Byrnes, All in One
Lifetime
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958),
p. 363.'
6

State Department Bulletin, Vol XII, January 7, 1945,
p. 23. Prime Minister Churchill referred to Stalin as "Uncle
Joe" on January 9, 1945, in a letter to President Roosevelt.
See U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States, The Confer
ence of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955), r.. 32.

The first chapter of this paper will investigate the
causes, events, and policies which precipitated the bipolari
zation of world powers after World War II.
perhaps,

Enigmatically

such bipolarization would include a split among the

wartime Big Three and would align former enemies, Germany and
Japan, with the Western Allies against the Soviet Union in a
policy of containment around the Soviet territorial periphery
or rimland.

5

CHAPTER I

THE DETERIORATION OF THE WARTIME ALLIANCE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION

The postwar age actually began in early February,
1945, at the Big Three meeting conducted at Yalta in the
Crimea.

In selecting a location for the meeting, Stalin

stated that the military situation on the Eastern Front
demanded his presence in Russia; therefore, he insisted on
the Crimea as the site of the conference.

Roosevelt, who

in top military advisor William Leahy's opinion was already
an ill and worn-out individual, was forced to undertake the
difficult trip to Russia via a stopover at Malta.

He was

accompanied by a host of political and military advisors,
including Secretary of State Stettinius and "Assistant
President" Byrnes.

Churchill and Stalin likewise had their

top aids in attendance.

8

At Yalta it was clear to the conferees that the
end of hostilities was "in sight," and consequently, a
8

Yorks

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New
Whittlesey House, 1950) , pp., 297-299.

6

9

determination of postwar policies was required.

It was also

obvious that England was no longer to play the star role in
international relations, because the United States and the
Soviet Union had clearly emerged as super-national powers
which would dominate the postwar world.

The unknown factor

in the equation was the degree of cooperation which could
reasonably be expected between the new dominant powers of
state.

10
The United States delegation approached Yalta with

some uneasiness.

In December,

1944, Roosevelt had become

disturbed by reports of Stalin's support for the Lublin
(Communist) Government of Poland rather than for the Free
Polish Government in exile in England.

The President wrote

to Stalin on December 16, 1944, requesting that Russia do
nothing in Poland until the issue was discussed at Yalta.

11

On December 27, 1944, Stalin replied in effect to the President
that he should mind his own business.

12

On December 30, 1944,

Roosevelt again wrote Stalin expressing his concern for

9Ibid., pp. 302-322.
10

John H. Jackson, The World in the Postwar Decade
1945-1955 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 3.
11

u • s •* Foreign Relations of the United States, The
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945
(Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 218.
12

Ibid., p. 221-223.

Poland,

but to no avail.

Stalin replied on January 1, 1945,

that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had on
December 27 decided to r ecognize the Provisional Government
M

of Poland as soon as it is formed."

I J

Yalta then was the initial encounter of the Cold
War, coming as it did after the Soviet Presidium's action
in regard to Poland's Communist government.
Actually, negotiations at Yalta proceeded smoothly
at first.

The Big Three Leaders had emerged unscathed in

the war as a result of tremendous personal efforts as well
as those on the part of their countrymen.

Unquestionably,

at Yalta at least some of the wartime "team spirit" still
persisted among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.

They were

proud of the exclusive nature of their "club" and even joked
about it.

For example, at one point in the conference,

Churchill remarked that the entrance fee for the Big Three
was 5,000,000 soldiers.

"Stalin must have bitterly reflected

that the entrance fee that Russia had paid was more than five
million dead soldiers."

14

13Ibid.. p. 226.
14
(New York:

Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography
Vintage Books, 1960), p. 526.

8

As the Yalta Conference progressed, the Big Three
found acceptable solutions to problems such as the composi
tion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the final
plans for the defeat of Germany, and the terms for Russian
entry into the war with Japan.

15

Even on the controversial

subject of Poland there was at least a tacit understanding.
Stalin agreed to a new government in Poland to replace the
Lublin regime.

The new government was to be "reorganized on

a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic
leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad."

16

All three nations considered Yalta a success at
its conclusion.
Stalin toasted:

"...to the firmness of our Three-

15 Leahy, p. 320. Concessions made by the U.S.
to Russia were attributed to the military situation which
existed at the time:
In Europe, territory lost to the
Germans in the Battle of the Bulge was only recently
(February 1, 1945) regained. , In the Japanese theater, the
Allies faced the momentous task of invading the Japanese
islands without, as yet, any help from the atomic bomb.
See Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1952), pp. 628-643.
lf t

State Department Bulletin, Vol XII, February 18,
1945, p. 215., and The New York Times, March 1, 1945. Also,
Leahy, p. 320.

9

Power Alliance.

May it be strong and stable; may we be as

frank as possible.”"1'7
Churchill commented on his return to England:

"I

know of no government which stands to its obligations, even
in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Government.

..18
Secretary of State Stettinius regarded Yalta as

"a most successful meeting" and pointed out that there was
"every evidence...of the Russian desire to cooperate along
all lines with the United States...."

19

Contrary to expectations, Stalin's promises at Yalta,
particularly those concerning Poland, proved to be the initia
tion of a continuing policy of misrepresentation of intentions
rather than the panacea for postwar international problems.
In the period immediately after Yalta,

the Russians were

negligent in carrying out the terms promised for the Polish
17
Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), p. 363.
TO

Ibid., p. 401.

York:

19
Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New
The Viking Press, 1951), p. 35.

10

20
government.

Free and unfettered elections as soon as possible

on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, as
specified in Section VII of the Yalta Agreements,

21
were not

conducted at all until January, 1947, and then they were not
"free and unfettered."

22

The Soviet Union's disregard for the. terms of the
Yalta Agreements produced an immediate reaction in the United
States and Britain.

On February 19, 1945, Senator Vandenberg

wrote a letter to Acting Secretary of State Grew, stating
that it had been
...asserted that...the Lublin government has
outlawed certain elements of the Polish army
which had been allied with the U. S. in the
Middle East and Italy as traitors.
If this
is true in any degree it seems to me that it
makes it simply unconscionably immoral for us
to recognize the Lublin government.^
20

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 418.

21

U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States. The
Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 980.
22
23

Jackson, pp. 20-22.

Arthur H. Vandenberg (ed.), The Private Papers of
Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952),
p. 150.

11

Churchill recognized the true Soviet Union objectives
as early as March, 1945.

In a letter to Roosevelt on March 27,

1945, Churchill said that he wanted no part of permitting the
"Russian version of democracy" to be imposed on Poland or
24
any other Eastern European nation.
Roosevelt responded to
Churchill that he viewed "with anxiety and concern the develop
ment of the Soviet attitude since.. .^^/Yalta^, and., .that the
time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader
aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference
to Poland)."

25

A subsequent message from the President to

Stalin expressed his concern in this regard.

26

Stalin replied

on April 7, 1945, that "matters on the Polish question have
really reached a dead end."

27

Almost simultaneously with the

^4Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 432.
^ I b i d . p . 435.
President had maintained a
Three unity and the end of
power, etc. See Leahy, p.

As late as March 1, 1945, the
degree of optimism regarding Big
spheres of influence, balance of
329.

26t v .,
Ibid.
27
U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States, The
Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 993.

12

exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Premier
Stalin/ Ambassador Harriman cabled Washington from Moscow,
“advocating /±n a general way/ a tough policy with Russia
as the one possible way of maintaining a soundly friendly
relationship with her."

28

As a result of the post-Yalta Polish situation
and other issues related to the Yalta Agreements, Congress
concluded that a change in United States policy was required.
On April 2, 1945, Mr. "Foreign Policy," Senator Vandenberg,
\

noted in his private papers,

following discussions with

Secretary of State Stettinius and Senator Connally, that
There is a general disposition to stop this
Stalin appeasement.
It has to stop sometime^
Every new surrender makes it more difficult.
Later in the same month, the Senator wrote in his
diary following another session with the Secretary of State
that the "revolt against any further Soviet appeasement is
growing."
oo

Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 40. On the 20th
of April, Harriman stated essentially the same thing to
Secretary Forrestal. See Millis, p. 47.
oq

Vandenberg, p. 161.

30Ibid., p. 165.

13

POTSDAM

Unfortunately for the cause of the United States,
the President, who alone was aware of all the facts in the
matter of negotiations with the Soviet Union, died a few
days after Senators Vandenberg and Connally's anti-appease
ment meeting with Stettinius and was succeeded by Vice
President Harry S. Truman.

With President Roosevelt's

untimely death, White House leadership in negotiations
with the Soviet Union was transferred to a man who initially
possessed only a limited understanding of the details of
the previous conferences.

31

As might be expected, Stalin characteristically
rose to the occasion of Roosevelt's death with the statement
that "We shall support President Truman with all our forces
and with all our will."

32

Stalin, the master opportunist,

quickly reversed a previous decision to restrict Molotov
from attending the opening session of the United Nations

^^Welles, pp. 340-341.
In Welles' opinion
President Truman possessed "neither knowledge, experience,
nor strength" for the Presidental task of directing foreign
policy.
32

York:

Elias M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors (New
The Viking Press, 1951), p. 63.

in San Francisco, and even permitted the Foreign Minister
to visit President Truman enroute.
The new President had found the occasion to studyrecent events and had become aware of the serious breach
developing between the two countries.

33

The meeting

between Truman and Molotov did not improve matters.

Truman

reported:
...a complete deadlock had been reached on the
subject of carrying out the Yalta agreement on
Poland...our agreements had so far been a on^]7
way street and that this could not continue.
As a result of Truman's discussions with Molotov regarding
the Polish government, Molotov stated that "I have never
been talked to like that in my life."
"Carry out your agreements,
like that."

35

The President replied,

and you won't get talked to

President Truman's official recognition of

Soviet deceit was only the first official indication of
a future change in United States policy.

Actions were

still many months away.

^Byrnes,

All in One Lifetime, pp. 287-288.

34

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol I: Year of Decisions
(Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 77.
35Ibid., p. 82.

15

Also in April,

1945, Prime Minister Churchill

directly challenged Stalin over the question of the Polish
Government.

By letter he warned Stalin that England would

not recognize a Polish Government not in accordance with
the Yalta Agreements.
step furtherz

36

The Prime Minister went even one

he recommended to the United States that

Allied armies advance as far as possible into Germany,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia —
agreements.

also contrary to previous

In this he was overruled by the American

President, and Russia proceeded to "liberate" Berlin,
Vienna,

and Prague.

37

In May of 1945, Churchill went on

to complain about the "iron curtain" which was descending
as the Soviet armies advanced and our own armies remained
static in their designated zones of occupation.

38

As Allied anxiety regarding the "iron curtain"
mounted,

the "Big Three" met at Potsdam, Germany,

in July,

36
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the
Russians (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1949), p. 317.
37
38

Jackson, p. 10.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 573.

16

1945.

In place of President Roosevelt there was Truman,

accompanied by Secretary of State (newly appointed) James
F. Byrnes.;

As a further complication,

in the middle of

the conference Churchill had to withdraw to London to
await the outcome of a general election.

Since he was

defeated and subsequently replaced by Mr. Attlee,
time Big Three was reduced to the Big "One" —

the war39
Stalin.

Although such knotty problems as German Reparations,
German economic unity, and the western boundary of Poland
were discussed with some success,

the question of Poland's

government "dominated the Conference."^ Between Yalta and
Potsdam,

the United States and Britain had withdrawn recogni

tion of the Polish exile government, and had, in faith with
Stalin's pledge for free elections, recognized the Provi
sional Lublin Government.

But at POtsdam,

there was still

no indication that Poland had been allowed any freedom of
action in her internal affairs, which remained dominated
by Red Army influence.
39
40

Churchill expressed concern in

Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 296.
Ibid., p. 299.

17

the opening sessions about Poland's plight,

since it was

to save this particular country from Fascism that Britain
went to war in the first place.

41

To the Prime Minister's

question regarding elections, Stalin replied:

"The Provi

sional Government of Poland have never refused to hold free
elections."

42

However, the Western Allies were convinced

otherwise, and insisted that the Potsdam Agreement reiterate
that Poland hold "free and unfettered elections...on the
basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot..."

43

While these negotiations were in progress at Potsdam,
President Truman was informed that an atomic bomb had been
successfully tested in New Mexico.
major repercussions.

44

This event was to have

When Churchill was likewise informed,

it was mutually agreed that Russia was no longer required
to fight against Japan.

^Churchill,
42

Stalin's reactions were twofold:

Triumph and Tragedy, p. 647.

Ibid., p. 654.

A'i

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XIII, August 5,
1945, p. 158.
44

Truman, I, 415-416.

18

his distrust of the Allies was increased immeasurably because
. 45
he had not been informed of the project from its inception
and secondarily, now foreseeing a quick termination of the
Japanese War, he hastened his declaration of war against
Japan,

in spite of the lack of enthusiasm for his action by

his allies, who had requested as a pre-requisite that Soviet
Russia conclude an agreement with China.

46

In retrospect Potsdam represented the last serious
attempt by the Big Three to amicably settle their differences.
Thereafter,

they designated their Foreign Ministers to debate

the issues at the conference table prior to top level considera
tion.

The first such meeting was scheduled for September,

1945,

in London. ^

MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

Between September,

1945, and July,

1946, there were

numerous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
^^Welles, p. 346. Stalin reacted quite casually when
President Truman informed him of the successful testing of the
first bomb.
See Deutscher, p. 547.
46

Truman, I, 425.
The bombing of Hiroshima occurred
on August 6, 1945. On August 8, 1945, Russia declared war on
Japan.
47

Amelia C. Leiss (ed.), European Peace Treaties
After World War II (World Peace Foundation, 1954), pp. 9-11.

19

primarily for the purpose of identifying the participants
and for making ground rules which would ultimately permit
the signing of peace treaties for the Balkan nations, Finland
and Italy.

In addition,

the agenda included consideration of

postwar government of Japan, Balkan governments, and atomic
4- 1 48
energy control.
The first session was held in London.

Thereafter,

the foreign ministers met at Moscow (December, 1945), London
(January,

1945) and finally in Paris

(April, 1946.

At all

of these conferences the United States was represented by
Secretary of State Byrnes.

49

From the beginning the meetings were a running
dispute between Byrnes and Molotov.

The conflicting

interests of the two powers represented by these individuals
caused ever increasing personal bitterness between the two
and political maneuvering at the conference tables.50

^ I b i d ., pp. 11-12.
49

D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 19171960 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 311,
337, 357-358.
50James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 92-100.

20

Byrnes'

long speeches on principles meant little to the

Russians, who, according to Churchill, recognized force as
the only basils for bargaining.

51

Molotov later remarked that

"he /Molotov/ wished he could find out what it was I /Byrnes/
52
wanted so we could negotiate."
Actually,
difficult.

the situation which Byrnes faced was most

In the first place, Allied military forces were

being de-mobilized even faster than the build-up had occurred
during the war.

Within a short period of time, a relative

Allied vacuum faced the Russian pressure in Europe.

53

In

addition, Britain was obviously on the decline, and its
future depended on the support which the United States might
render in the postwar world.

54

Since her other European

Allies were in an even worse condition than Britain,

the

United States alone suddenly faced Soviet power in Europe.
A third factor which complicated Byrnes'
51

52

Millis,

job was the open

The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144-145.

Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 100.

53
William B. Ziff, Two Worlds (New York:
Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1946), p. 256. The New York Times,
January 5, 1946, reported that the War Department was forced
to slow down demobilization, since only 1,500,000 soldiers
remained overseas (global).
54

Ibid., p. 265.

21

hostility of Stalin and Molotov to any American proposal.
Molotov still smarted over his encounter with the candid
American President.

Stalin's distrust of his Western Allies

dated back to 1943 when he felt that Russia's very existence
depended on the timely initiation of a Second Front by England
and the United States.

When this did not materialize until

1944, Stalin conjectured that possibly his allies were
intentionally delaying invasion plans to permit their two
ideological opponents to consume each other.

55

In addition,

Stalin could not forget his exclusion from the development
of the atomic bomb, nor the sudden cessation of Lend-Lease
aid after the final victory over Japan.

56

Finally, the

Soviet leader found it difficult to ignore his exclusion by
the United States from active participation in matters
,
.
57
pertaining to the Japanese occupation Government.

^ J o h n W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since
World War II (New York:
Frederich A. Praeger, Publisher,
1960), p. 16.
56

,
.
George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (4th ed.
rev.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 453.
The New York Times, January 26, 1946, reported that Russia
had asked for $6 billion in credits during the peace years
“to help reconstruct after the war."
57

Redfers Opie, The Search for Peace Settlements
(Washington:
The Brookings Institute, 1951), p. 80.

22

On the other side.of the ledger there was the growing
animosity which the United States held for Russia.

The situa

tion in Poland, which has already been reviewed, was not soon
forgotten, even though that nation was already firmly behind
the Iron Curtain.

In addition, the. United States was

perturbed by the methods utilized by the Soviet government
in maintaining governments "friendly" to Soviet Russia in
Bulgaria, Hungary,

and Rumania,

in conflict with the letter

and spirit of the Yalta Agreements.^ Finally,

there was

the problem of Russian troops remaining in Iran after the
war was over.

Byrnes advised Stalin in December that if

Iran brought this issue to the United Nations that the United
States would support Iran.

In January,

1946, this occurred.

When the Secretary reacted as promised, both Stalin and
Molotov became furious.

Later, Molotov charged Byrnes

with deliberately instigating an "anti-Soviet" campaign
in Iran.

59
For the United States in the immediate postwar

period, Secretary Byrnes was indeed the "key" to the situation.
In the early months after the war, Byrnes kept the affairs
of state mainly to h i m s e l f ? ^ however, this tendency was
58

Leiss, p. 6.

60Welles, p. 386.

59

Opie, pp. 84-87.

23

quickly changed by the President who recognized the value
of a foreign policy which was understood and supported by
the people and Congress.

Another of Byrnes* ideosynerosies

was related to his leadership of State Department delegations
at overseas conferences.

At meetings conducted with Molotov,

Byrnes often made on-the-scene decisions for the Nation.
President Truman later expressed his concern for this
usurption of Presidential authority when he said that
"More and more during the fall of 1945 I came to feel that
in his role as Secretary of State, Byrnes was beginning to
think of himself as an Assistant President in full charge
of foreign policy.”^
For his conciliatory actions at London,

in December,

1945, Byrnes was criticized by members of a variety of factions.
Sumner Welles accused Byrnes of departing from
the fundamental principles established by the
Yalta Agreements in order to appease the
Soviet government.
In a further effort at
appeasement, we have recognized the Communist
minority dictatorships in Yugoslavia and in
Rumania...^2
Senator Vandenberg later remarked that he thought Byrnes

^Truman,

I, 546.

^Welles, p. 380.
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was "loitering around Munich" in this period.
hand, according to Byrnes himself,

On the other

there were those in the

State Department who thought that the Secretary had been anything but conciliatory at London.
Finally,

in January,

64

1946, the President interceded

by personal action, with a letter to Byrnes which provided the
"point of departure of our new policy."

The last sentence

contained the essence of his thoughts for he said:
tired of babying the Soviets."

"I’m

65

Senator Vandenberg confirmed the new thinking in a
speech on February 27, 1946, in which he asked the Senate
the question,

"What is Russia up to now?".

The Senator

further specified that "there is a line beyond which compro
mise cannot g o . " ^
63

Vandenberg, p. 246.

64

Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 321. See John
Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:
The MacMillan Co.,
1950), pp. 29-30.
65

Truman, I, 551-552. See also James F. Byrnes,
"Byrnes Answers Truman", Collier's, April 8, 1952.
The former
Secretary of State denies that the alleged letter by President
Truman "was either read to me or sent to me." The issue of
the existence of the letter apparently has never been fully
resolved.
^Vandenberg, pp. 246-249.
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In July-August,

1946, the Paris Peace Conference

categorically convinced Secretary Byrnes of the fallacy of
.trusting the Russians in negotiations.

Afterwards, Byrnes

stated
...I should be less than frank if I did not
confess, my bewilderment at the motives which
the Soviet Delegation attributed to the United
States at Paris... They charged that the United
States...was now seeking to enslave Europe
economically.^7
Even though peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Hungary, and Finland were signed in February,
1947,

68

Byrnes had already resigned two weeks before,

and was replaced by George C. Marshall.

THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD IN RETROSPECT

There has been much speculation in the past twenty
years that the United States was "sold out" at. Yalta.

Yet

in retrospect, when the United States' concessions to Soviet
Russia are measured against her military requirement for
Soviet participation in the Far.East theater of operations,
they become more reasonable.

^Zacharias, p. 72.

In Europe the situation

^Leiss, p. 15.
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emerging from Yalta was more immediately of grave concern
to the Western Allies, as the Soviet leaders neglected to
abide by Big Three sanctioned agreements, most distinctly
in the case of Poland.
After Potsdam, the de facto military situation in
Eastern Europe precluded any earnest endeavors by the United
States and Britain to force Russian compliance with the Yalta
Agreements,

69

•
for by calculation Stalin maintained large

military forces in Europe for the purpose of extending
Communist influence.

On the other hand, Britain and the

United States rationalized that agreements with Russia would
indeed be binding and as such, adequate for the security of
Europe.

Consequently, military forces in Europe other than

those for constabulary and occupation duties were essentially
disbanded and returned to the parent nations en masse.

This

disregard for the military balance of power in Europe would
lead to some rather emphatic reversals of policy within a
short period of time.

Fortunately for the Allies, Russia's

staggering war losses, both in industrial capability and
manpower,

limited to a degree a timely and more aggressive

69
W. W. Rostrow, The United States in the World Arena
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 177.
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policy in Europe; otherwise, not only Poland, Austria,
Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia would have become
Communist, but possibly West Germany, Belgium,
Luxemburg,

France, and Italy as well.

the Netherlands,

70

By early 1947, Russian designs on western Europe had
become clear enough for the United States to recognize that
a major policy change was not only in order, but absolutely
essential.
70

Deutscher, p. 532.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE U. S. POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

A new policy was first suggested by the United States
Charge d* Affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, who cabled
his recommendations to Washington in February,

1946.

In

July of the following year, essentially the same information
appeared in Foreign Affairs Magazine, anonymously authored
by Mr. "X".

Ambassador Kennan*s analysis indicated that

United States foreign policy required reshaping along lines
to counter Soviet ''expansive tendencies" wherever they might
occur on the Soviet periphery.

1

As Secretary of State Acheson later remarked, the
object of the containment policy was, and is, to build
situations of strength in opposition to Soviet thrusts

George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (The University
of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 107-124 for the text of Kennan‘s
article in Foreign Affairs Magazine. See also James Burnham,
Containment or Liberation (New York:
The John Day Co., 1952),
p. 20. Also, Rostow, p. 199. Also, J. F. Dulles, War or
Peace, pp. 29-30.
Dulles says that containment is a "no
appeasement" policy and that Secretary Byrnes initiated it in
September 1945. However, the first reference to the policy
as a national objective is contained in Mr. Kennan's cable
to Washington.

towards political and/or military vacuums.
policy proved successful,

2

If the new

it would promote tendencies

which must eventually find their outlet in either the
break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.^
Containing Communism on a near global scale promised
to be no mean assignment for the United States and its
Allies.

Ambassador Kennan's definition of containment

specifically warned of the long term requirements of the
new policy.

In this regard,

implementation of such a

policy would require not only free nations on the periphery
with stable governments and sound economies, but in addition,
would require the necessary military forces within the
territorial confines of the peripheral nations to thwart
communist aggression from its inception and prevent further
losses in the balance of power.

Such Allied military

counter-actions would be required on a quick reaction basis there would be no time available to call up and train the
reserves.
2

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, March 20, 1950

p. 427.
3

Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 124.
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How the United States faced the total threat posed
by the Soviet Union on all fronts and how she assisted in
the reestablishment of economically stable governments on
the Russian periphery will be further discussed.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The first of many confrontations between the United
States and Russia which called for the application of the
policy of containment occurred in early 1947 in Greece
and Turkey.

More precisely,

it was the first encounter

between the two world giants wherein the Soviet position
was not directly enhanced and guaranteed by the Red Army;

4

as such it was indeed the first situation which was really
contestable at all.
The trouble within Greece was precipitated by
Communist guerilla actions emanating from and supported
through Yugoslavia.
4

A Communist take over appeared likely.

Spanier, p. 19. Secretary Marshall, in Moscow in
early 1947, later said..."I was being pressed constantly...
to give the Russians hell...At that time, the facilities for
giving them hell...was 1-1/3 divisions over the entire U.S.
That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with
over 260...".
See John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel
Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 282.
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Similarly,

in Turkey apprehension mounted as Communists

applied diplomatic pressure and threatened the use of
i
5
military force.
On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador
submitted two communiques to the United States Which declared
that the British economy could not continue to provide aid
to either Greece or Turkey and that within weeks British
military support must be terminated.

On a priority basis,

the State Department analyzed the problem facing Greece and
Turkey and obtained the concurrence of President Truman that
American economic and military aid constituted the best
possible solution.

6

On the 12th of March, 1947, the admini

stration’s plans for the assistance program for Greece and
Turkey had progressed sufficiently for the President to
present specific details to a joint session of Congress.
The President said
I believe that it must be the policy of
the United States to support free people who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures...The assistance that I
5
Rostow, p. 207.
^Alexander de Conde, ’’George Catlett Marshall, " An
Uncertain Tradition, (ed.) Norman A. Graebner (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 251.
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am recommending for Greece and Turkey /?400,000,0007
amounts to little more than one-tenth of one percent
o f . ../the wartime investment of $341,000,000,000/. ^
For Congress in 1947 the bill which would implement
the Truman Doctrine was somewhat difficult to accept without
considerable deliberation prior to passage.
debate ensued on the floors of Congress,

A protracted

in which it was

asserted by Senator Vandenberg that the United Nations had
been created specifically to maintain the peace and that
consequently American assistance to Greece and Turkey should
be administered under the auspices of the United Nations.
Others saw Greece and Turkey as clearly beyond the area
where the United States should directly intervene? on the
contrary,

they argued that the eastern Mediterranean area

was and should remain primarily a British concern.

Others

debated that intervention in Greece and Turkey could lead
to further involvement in the form of dangerous confrontations directly with Soviet Russia.

8

Proponents of the legislation argued simply and
effectively that Greece and Turkey would become Communist
7
State Department Bulletin, Vol. XVI, March 23, 1947,
pp. 536-537.
8

Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power,
1898-1954 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1954),
p. 232.
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if Congress failed to act favorably on the assistance act.
Ultimately,

the act passed Congress on May 22, 1947, after

a vote of 287 to 107 in the House and 67 to 28 in the Senate.
The State Department proceeded to reach agreements with Greece
and Turkey in June and July of 1947, thereby consummating
America's first positive action toward containing Communism
in Southern Europe and the Middle East.

9

THE MARSHALL PLAN

While the Truman Doctrine promised to secure the
"southern flank of Europe,"

10

it did not directly address

itself to the postwar problems of Western Europe.

Since a

small number of American troops remained in that area, the
threat of direct Soviet intervention was rather distant,
obviously because the small contingent could be reinforced
if required.

On the other hand, economic problems Were

probably just as acute in Europe as in Greece and Turkey.
9
William Reitzel et al. United States Foreign Policy,
1945-1955 (Washington:
The Brookings Institute, 1956), p. 116.
See also F. R. Dulles, p. 232.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden
City, N. Y . : Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 80.
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The items needed to recover from the devastations of four
years of war, such as "wheat, cotton, sulphur, machinery,
trucks,

and coat," were available only in the United S t a t e s . ^

This shortage of raw materials in turn created a shortage in
export produce? hence there were few American dollars coming
into Europe.

Thus, a dollar gap existed which propelled

European economies headlong toward the precipice of complete
collapse.
Even before 1947, the United States had recognized
the serious economic situation in Western Europe.
December,

In

1945, at the termination of Lend-Lease aid, a

loan of $3,750,000,000 had been extended to Britain in an
effort to maintain the stability of the pound.

A similar

loan of $1,200,000,000 was made to France, and before the
end of 1946, a total of $7,500,000,000 in loans was extended
to Western Europe.

13

This financial assistance proved

insufficient to maintain solvency.

By 1947, the economic

crisis had permitted political gains by the Communist parties
in France and Italy, and by early 1948 had exhausted the
$3,750,000,000 loan to Britain.

14

11Spanier/ p. 39

12Ibid.

^Rostow, pp. 197-198

^ T h e New York Times, March 4, 1948
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Whereas there had been some opposition in Congress
to American assistance rendered previously to Greece and
Turkey because the area was so far afield,

few Congressmen

contested the requirement for United States assistance in
Europe to maintain a favorable balance of power in so vital
an area.

The consequences to the United States of a Communist

Europe were clear to most government officials? hence even
by 1947 Europe was recognized as America's first line of
defense in a contest or possible war with Russia.

15

Into the middle of Europe's economic problems
stepped the new Secretary; of State, George C. Marshall, who
was recalled from China to replace James F. Byrnes, effective
o n J a n u a r y 8, 1947.

In April, Marshall created within the

State Department a new super planning division which he
called the "Policy Planning Staff."

Headed by Mr. "X,”

George F. Kennan, the policy planning staff Was initially
directed to devise an overall plan for the reconstruction
of Western Europe.

16

The resultant plan, which called for a

large economic aid program for Europe, was completed on
May 23, 1947, and introduced by Secretary Marshall in a
15

Spanier, p. 40

1ft
Rostow, pp. 209-210.
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speech at Harvard's Graduation Exercise on June 5, 1947.
In his address, Secretary Marshall said
The breakdown of the business structure of
Europe during the war was complete... she must
have substantial additional help or face
economic, social, and political deterioration
of a very grave character...The initiative, I
think, must come from Europe. ^
The Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program
as it was officially designated, was developed in detail
during the second half of 1947.

Under this plan United

States officials asked seventeen European states to present
a "plan for their common needs and common recovery."^
With the consent of the other participating members, Great
Britain shaped the joint recovery plan and the request to
the United States.19
The State Department originally estimated that the
four-year costs of the European Recovery Program would
approach $22,000,000,000; however,

in the course of debates

Instate Department Bulletin, Vol. XVI, June 15, 1947,
pp. 1159-1160.
l8Ibid.
19

Rostow, p. 213. Participating members formed the
Organization of European Economic Cooperation, which became
the instrument for application of American assistance.
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and refinements in the Congress,

the figure was reduced to

$17,000,000,000 and in actuality between 1948 and 19 52,
only $12,000,000,000 in aid was delivered.

20

Although the final and complete European Recovery
Program did not pass Congress until April 1948, an Interim
Aid Plan for France, Italy, and Austria was submitted to
21

Congress in November,

1947, and received quick passage.

John Foster Dulles was in France at the time the Interim Aid
Plan was under consideration by Congress, and he related how
Communist strikes had disrupted rail communication, paralyzed
industry, and interrupted the supply of electric power and
water in Paris.

He recorded that the strikes subsided in

December as France regained hope and confidence with the
promise of economic aid from the United States.

22

The

Foreign Aid Act of 1947, as the Interim Plan was officially
designated,

in authorizing $597,000,000 in aid, stated that

It is the purpose of this Act to provide immediate
aid urgently needed by the peoples of Austria,

^"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950,"
The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951.
Paul
Hoffman, Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration
estimated the 4% year ERP Program costs at $17,000,000,000.
See Appendix A for a summary of foreign aid (and military aid)
for the period 1946-1955.
21

J. F. Dulles, pp. 106-108.

China, France, and Italy...to alleviate conditions
of hunger and cold and prevent serious economic
retrogression.^
America's economic plans for European recovery took
the initiative from the Soviet bloc.

Soviet satellite nations

in eastern Europe initially reacted favorably to overtures for
their participation,

since their economic situation was similar

to that within western European nations.

However, within the

Kremlin there was consternation concerning the ultimate effects
of such cooperation with Capitalism on the part of Soviet
satellite nations.

Fearing that he might lose some of his

tight control over the nations, Stalin disapproved their*
participation m

the European Recovery Program.

24

In Moscow,

Ambassador Walter B. Smith reported that the Soviet Union
publicly criticized economic assistance plans of the United
States as a "cunning way of subjecting all Europe to American
capital.
The plan proved to be not only a significant political
maneuver in that it provided a degree of unification among
23

U. S., Congress, Foreign Aid Act of 1947, Public
Law 389, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, Sec. 2.
24

Rostow, p. 212.
The subsequent quasi-defection
of Yugoslavia and the revolt in Hungary proved that Staliri's
concern was well-founded.
25
Walter B. Smith, My Three Years in Moscow
(Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1950), pp. 172-173.
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Western European nations vis-a-vis Communism, but of even
more importance,

it proved successful in its economic mission*

By 1950 European production exceeded production figures for
1939

by twenty-five percent,

26

by 1951,

forty percent.

27

The massive success enjoyed in Europe even had the side
effect of creating a boom in the United States, since
European dollars became available for the purchase of
American products.

28

AID PROGRAMS IN RETROSPECT

As the Truman Doctrine contained Communism in Greece
and Turkey, so did the European Recovery Program contribute
to its containment in Europe.

Ambassador Smith said that

"The Marshall Plan...has been the major force in the
stabilization of Europe..."

29

The two plans clearly mark a

turning point in American-Soviet relations in that they
actively initiated the Cold War for the Allies, opened the
door for the Point Four assistance program,
26
28
30

Spanier, p. 43.
Spanier, p. 43.

30

and finally

27
Rostow, p. 216.
oq

Smith, p. 332.

The Point Four program provided technical assistance
for undeveloped nations.
It was called "Point Four" because
it was the fourth point mentioned in the Presidential address
of January 20, 1949, which introduced it. See Rostow, p. 256.
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precipitated the next step in containing Communism, a
collective security defense pact.

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

The European Recovery Program certainly did not ease
the tensions which had developed between the United States
*

and the Soviet Union since 1945, nor was it designed to do
so.

The resultant Soviet boycott of and resentment to the

plan did, however, add a new subject for tirades from
F. M. Molotov and the Soviet foreign office.

Concurrent

with the propoganda emanating from Moscow was a continued
Communist effort to bring under Soviet Control additional
European nations.

Efforts to expand Soviet influence proved

successful in Czechoslovakia, When a successful Communist
Party coup d ’etat established Soviet domination and Communist
control in February,

1948.

31

The apprehension which had been mounting among the
remaining free European nations now reached the acute state
as they realized that military unity would be required to
31

** M. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe: A History
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 374.
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complement American economic assistance.

In early 1948

England and France were formally allied under the terms of
the Dunkirk Pact.
to include Belgium,

In March,

1948, this alliance was expanded

the Netherlands, and Luxemberg, and was

called the Brussels Pact.

At the same time there was

serious thought and discussion by the National Security
Council of bringing the United States into a military
32
alliance with the Brussels Pact nations.
These open manifestations by the European community
to stop Communism, overtly if necessary, caused Stalin deep
concern as did the spectre of a resurgent Germany.
Secretary Byrnes, at Stuttgart, Germany,

When

in 1946, stated

that "the German people..., under proper safeguards, should
now be given primary responsibility for the running of their
33
own affairs," it became clear that the United States and
Soviet Russia had vastly different ideas as to the future
of Germany.

In addition to Byrnes' proposal to transfer a

32

"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950,"
The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951.
The
idea had been introduced as early as March, 1946, in the
W. S. Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri.
See also F. R. Dulles, p. 241.
33

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XV, September 15,
1946, p. 499.
The first step towards economic revival in
Germany consisted of General Clay's action in May, 1946, of
terminating reparation deliveries from the American Zone of
Germany.
See Rostow, p. 191.
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degree of self-control.to the Germans, between 1946 and 1948
the United States and her Allies became staunch supporters
of German economic unification.

This concept also was

opposed by Russia who sought to maintain the status quo of
separate zones.

34

As the Brussels Pact alliance evolved,

the issue of Germany took on more and more importance, not
only because of Germany's previous roles as chief antagonist
in the two World Wars, but now, and more importantly, because
she was enmeshed between Communism and the free world in the
area which held the industrial balance of power — the heart
of industrial Europe.

Thus by 1948, Germany, which only

three years before had been the instrument Of unity between
the United States and Soviet Russia now had become,
words of Bernard Baruch,

in the

the "focus of their disunity."^

Secretary Marshall's State Department deputy, Dean
Acheson,

later summarized the events relating to Germany in

1948 by saying that the Soviets clearly were seeking "virtual
control over German economic and political life."

The

"resultant paralysis" in Germany would obviously hinder the

^^Ro s tow, p . 193.
35

Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years (New York:
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 409.

Holt,
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overall European Recovery Plan which needed German resources
and industrial strength.

36

The only recourse open to the

Allies appeared to be a complete economic unification of
the three zones occupied by the United States, England,
France.

By agreement in London,

in June,

and

1948, this unifi

cation became a reality, with the added proviso that Germany
would be authorized a provisional government exclusive of
the zone occupied by the Soviets but including the alliedcontrolled areas in Berlin, deep inside the Soviet Zone.

37

Concurrent with the new economic and political reorganiza
tion of Germany was a currency r eform.

The purpose of

this action was to free the newly unified area financially
38
from the inflated currency of the old Reichsmark.
Ambassador Smith in Moscow reported that the Allied
moves towards unification and revival of Germany were consid
ered by Stalin as a direct challenge to Soviet Union
36
McGeorge Bundy (ed.), Pattern of Responsibility
(Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), pp. 103-104.
See State Department Bulletin, Vol. XX, p. 586, for the
text of Mr. Acheson's speech.
37

Ibid. 2,500,000 Germans lived on the “island" of
Berlin.
See J. F. Dulles, pp. 54-56.
See Appendix B, a map
of the zones of Germany.
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interests in Europe.

39

On June 24/ 1948, from Moscow came the

order to retaliate with a land and rail blockade of the allied
access route to Berlin, virtually isolating the 2,500,000
Berliners on their island within a sea under Communist control.
From the initiation, Stalin hoped to trade a delay of the
formation of the new West German government as the price
for termination of the blockade.
unacceptable to the Allies,

If this trade proved

the alternative,

was an allied withdrawal from Berlin.

as he saw it,

41

The United States avoided these alternatives by
choosing a third alternative, one probably unexpected by the

Germany and Europe into .Berlin, called “Operation Vittles"
by the American pilots who flew their C-47 and C-54 cargo
aircraft over the land blockade.
On June 26, 1948, the
planes

42

massive airlift began, with

eventually attaining a landing interval of as close
39

Smith, p. 230. Smith and Molotov had discussed the
overall situation in Europe at some length in May, 1948, with
out effectively relaxing tensions.
See Smith, pp. 159-164.
40

Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 365.
41
42

Berlin

Smith, pp. 252-253.

Clay, pp. 367-381.
Also W. Phillips Davison, The
Blockade
(Princeton University
Press, 1958), pp. 105-107.
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as one every three minutes and delivering payloads of from
4,000 tons to almost 13,000 tons per day.

43

Reaction to the blockade was rather slow in coming.
Not until October did the item appear on the United Nations
Security Council agenda; that agency proceeded to study the
problem during the winter of 1948-1949.

44

The next Soviet

move occurred on December 1, 1948, when a separate Communist
city government was installed in the Soviet Sector of
Berlin.

45
Some 321 days later,

the efforts of the American

Air Force had proven that free Berliners could survive on
goods delivered by air supply lines only.

The airlift had

successfully weathered the winter fogs at the Berlin aerodromes. 46

American prestige in Germany was vastly enhanced

as a result of the tremendous effort on the part of our
airmen in delivering vitally-needed food and coal for
survival.

47

An allied counter-blockade of East Germany

43

Clay, p. 381. Eventually, a total of 1,592,787
tons of supplies were moved in to Berlin.
See Smith, p. 231.
44
45
46

J. F. Dulles, pp. 56-57,
The New York Times, December 1, 1948.
,
Ibid.

47

J. F. Dulles, p. 58.

46

had proven more effective than the Berlin Blockade.
Consequently, Stalin decided to pick a time and place
suitable to the Soviet cause and terminate the blockade.
Thus, on the 12th of May,

48

1949, the blockade ended

on terms advantageous to the United States and West Germany.

49

This overt action on the part of the United States
in meeting Soviet aggressive tendencies in Germany demon
strated the effectiveness of the containment policy when
backed with determination and resources.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

As Secretary Marshall had related in Moscow in
early 1947, it was quite difficult to negotiate with the
Soviets when backed by only 20,000 troops as opposed to over
2,500,000 on their side.

50

Secretary Byrnes had also been

48

Smith, p. 257. After Stalin mentioned that the
Berlin situation might be "solvable," subsequent discussions
with Mr. Malik led to the actual termination agreement.
See
J. F. Dulles, p. 58.
49
50

Ibid.

Sparrow, p. 282. Actually, a fraction over one United
States Army division faced over 260 Russian divisions.
See
Hanson W. Baldwin, The Great Arms Race (New York:
Frederick
A.‘ Praeger, Publishers, 1958), p. 36, for a comparison of the
fire power of American and Soviet army divisions.
In December
1946, the Air Force had only two combat air wings to comple
ment the Army divisions.
See Rostow, p. 172.

47
faced with the same problem in his dealings with Molotov and
later remarked that " H e /Truman/ announced the policy of
containing Russia.. ./put/ failed to provide any divisions to
51
support such a policy."
The search for an improved military posture which
would transform Allied forces from their weakened, demobi
lized condition into a credible deterrence was a two-pronged
effort.

The American monopoly on the atomic bomb and the

means to deliver it were exploited with an almost immediate
increase to eleven combat-ready wings within the Air Force
by mid-19.47.

52

The National Security Act of July 1947

provided for a major reorganization of the national military
structure.

This act, the so-called Unification Act,

actuality created a third service,

in

the Air Force, which was

elevated to equality with the Army and the Navy.

New agencies

formed included the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency,
Board.

53

In short,

and the National Security Resources
the new reorganization promised improved

51

James F. Byrnes,
April 26, 1956.
52
53

"Byrnes Answers Truman," Collier's,

Rostow, p. 172.

Rostow, p. 174.
The National Security Council was
created with the purpose in mind of coordinating military and
foreign policy. Although initially dominated by military
representation (all three service secretaries plus the Secretary
of Defense), eventually the three service representatives were
dropped.
See Graebner, p. 260.

48

efficiency and coordination for the formation of national
policy as well as the application of national force if
required.
The second of the two-pronged effort to enhance the
military posture of the United States vis-a-vis Soviet
Russia was aimed directly at the area where Soviet aggression
tendencies were prevalent and where already the Interim Aid
Bill and the European Recovery Plan had sought to stave off
aggression through economic means.

Russian opposition to

the Interim Aid Bill, the excessive use of the veto in the
United Nations Security Council, the stalemate at the
London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December,
and the fall of Czechoslovakia in January,

1947,

1948, convinced

Secretary Marshall and other national leaders of the
necessity to-complement the European aid programs with
active military protection.

54

Although discussions and thought at the time empha
sized the military defensive alliance as the prime function
of the future organization, other obvious benefits from such
an alliance were not excluded.

For example,

it was

recognized that the unity provided by a mutual defense pact
54

Graebner, p. 261.

49

Would provide considerable advantages in political negotiations with Soviet Russia.
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The formation of the Brussels Pact in March, 1948,
provided the vehicle through which expansion could be
accomplished to include the North American nations of
Canada and the United States.

The suggestion by Canadian

Prime Minister St. Laurent in April,
sion, ^

1948, for such inclu

provided the concept with the necessary momentum.

The United States Senate,

spurred on by the initiation of

the Berlin Blockade in June, passed a resolution introduced
by Senator Vandenberg in mid-June,
agreed in advance to United States*

1948, which basically
"association...with

such regional and other collective arrangements as are
based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid..."

57

The Vandenberg Resolution thus paved the way

for preliminary negotiations in July,

1948, in Washington.

58

55
Robert E. Osgood, NATO:
The Entangling Alliance
(The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 32-33.
56
57

Ibid.
State Department Bulletin, Vol. IX, July 18, 1949,

p. 79.
58

Osgood, p. 33. Bailey, p. 808, points out that
the Senate Resolution broke the long-standing U. S. policy
of maintaining no entangling alliances in Europe.
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In the preliminary planning stage,

there were some

who considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as
a sort of a Kellogg-Briant Pact for western nations wherein
if any of its members were attacked,

the remaining members

would respond with military force against the aggression.
Dean Acheson of the State Department said that
What is required /Tn lieu of brute force stoppage7
is rather sufficient strength to make it impossible
for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy
victory... The fundamental pledge of the treaty,
that an attack on one signatory will mean an
attack on all, closes the door to piecemeal
aggression.59
^
The "guaranty pact" concept created considerable
apprehension in the forward area where about twelve scattered
divisions faced twenty-five fully armed and, more importantly,
fully coordinated Soviet divisions.

60

French Premier

H. Queuille predicted that any recurrence of invasion such
as those of the two previous world wars would leave France
only a corpse and not worth recovery.

Consequently, he

emphasized that the American line of defense in Europe must
be considered the existing Soviet border.

61

59

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXI, August 8, 1949,
p. 193. George F. Kennan concurred in this "guaranty pact"
concept.
See Osgood, pp. 33-35.
^Osgood, pp. 28-29.
61

The New York Times, March 3, 1949, p. 5.
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In accordance with French desires, a "forward
strategy" was finally adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization with the concurrence of the United States.
Military planners foresaw a requirement for something on
the order of eighty to eighty-five divisions of ground
forces with two-thirds of these to be immediately available.
Such a ground force would serve two purposes:

(1)

62

Act as a

"trip wire" in which initial contact in an invasion would
directly involve a clash with American nationals and hence
assure full United States retaliation,

(2) Actually hold the

Red Army at the Elbe River until the full force of American
airpower could be applied.
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Although there was never much doubt regarding the
approval by the Brussels Pact nations of the broader treaty,
since the inclusion of the United States inspired considerable
confidence in Western Europe, prospective members were
62
63

Osgood, p. 34-38.

Spanier, p. 50. European members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, particularly Great Britain, graciously
permitted the use of their aerodromes for the American Air
Force's deployment of atomic bombers in support of the second
purpose.
For a discussion of the "trip-wire" concept, see
Glenn H. Snyder Deterrence and Defense (Princeton University
Press, 1961), pp. 130-131.
See map, Appendix C, for a graphical
display of treaty members.
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"advised” to join the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization if they expected any military aid from the United States.
On April 4, 1949, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Great Britian,

Iceland,

Italy, Luxemberg,

64

France#

the Netherlands

Norway, Portugal, and the United States signed the treaty
which formed the new organization.

65

As approved,

the treaty

guaranteed military assistance from all members in the event
of an attack on one of its members.

Even more important

was the fact that it specified that a joint military staff
be formed to assure unified actions for forces commited to
mutual support.
Congress,

In addition,

its format, as presented to

authorized the President to use American forces

as required in support of the mutual defense agreement.
In spite of these far-reaching,

and on. the whole, quite

revolutionary provisions, public debate on the treaty in
the United States fell far short of expectancies.

66

Dean

Acheson had little difficulty maneuvering the treaty through
64

The New York Times, January 15, 1949, p. 1.

65State Department Bulletin, Vol. XX, April 17, 1949,
pp. 471-482.
^ The New York Times. May 19, 1949.
Initially,
there was no direct commitment of American ground forces autho
rized for integration with North Atlantic Treaty Organization
forces.
However, this integration did occur in 1951 and 1952.
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the Senate which had previously agreed to the principle in
advance.

The Senate approved the measure on July 21, 1949,

by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen.

67

Brussels Pact nations were so confident that the
Senate would approve the treaty that on April 5, 1949/ the
day after the signing, but well in advance of Senate approval,
they delivered a request to the United States for military
assistance to put teeth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation Pact.
Their request stated that
In order to carry out a common defence
programme...there is an urgent need for
United States material and financial
assistance.
In response to this request, on the same day that
he signed the treaty implementing the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, President Truman presented a bill to Congress
authorizing military assistance to countries included in the
new organization.
67
68

As approved in October,

1949, this bill

F. R. Dulles, p. 244.

John Gange, American Foreign Relations (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1959), pp. 122-123. Although the
quotation is from paragraph 5 of the request from the Brussels
Pact nations, the words deleted refer to the previous portion
of the request, which enumerated the principles upon which
further negotiations should proceed.
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authorized expenditures "not to exceed $500,000,000" but
with another $500,000,000 available on a standby basis.
Thus, the loop in Europe was completed.
aid

had been provided.

69

Economic

A viable military organization

supported by American atomic bombers had come into being,
and finally, military assistance had been authorized by
the

Congress for European allies.

A feeling of complacency

set

in temporarily in the United States only to

be shattered

for the long term by the Soviet detonation of an atomic
device in 1949 and for the short term by the Korean War
which commenced in 1950. 70

THE KOREAN WAR

The long term destabilizing event,

the Soviet

atomic bomb, could be met only by increasing the potency of
the United States' strategic deterrence.

President Truman's

approval for the production of a hydrogen bomb in January,
1950, and the build-up of the Strategic Air Command assured
at least a temporary advantage over the Soviet Union in
this regard.

71

69 U. S. Congress, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949, Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Sec. 102
and 103.
70

Osgood, pp. 50-51.

71

Rostow, p. 233.
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The successful economic revival of Western Europe,
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the resurgence of Germany,
Berlin,

and finally,

the successful airlift into

the implementation of the Schumann Plan 72

all contributed to the Soviet stratagem of a transference of
expansive tendencies from Western Europe to the Far East.
Stymied by allied strength in Europe, the Soviet Union turned
elsewhere to a geographical location where the balance of
power was in her favor. 73

Such a situation had been created

by the withdrawal in June,

1949, of 50,000 American occupation

troops from the area of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

74

The surprise and unprovoked attack on South Korea
occurred before dawn on June 24, 1950.
Republic of Korea defenders,

75

The stunned

supported only by a handful

72

The Schumann Plan of May 1950 sought "increased
productivity in the European steel and coal industries."
It
also bound France and Germany together in ways which would
minimize the possibilities of future friction and conflict."
See Rostow, p. 218.
73

Spanier, p. 67.
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"Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950,"
Congressional Digest, Volume 30, January to December, 1951.
75
and Hope

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol II: Years of Trial
(Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 332.
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of American military advisers, reeled southward from the
effects of the North Korean artillery barrages and troop
assaults.76
President Truman, enroute from Washington to Kansas
City at the time of the attack, kept abreast of the situation
by telephone with the new Secretary of State Acheson and the
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk. The
gravity of the situation as reported from Korea caused the
President to return to Washington the following day.

John

Foster Dulles, who only a few days before had returned from
a visit to South Korea, cabled Washington from Tokyo as
follows:
...to sit by while Korea is over-run by an
unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous
chain of events leading most probably to world
war.77
Unquestionably,

the Korean invasion constituted the

severest test thus far of the containment policy.

Secretary

Acheson had committed the United States to the defense of
free Asia on general security grounds and had specifically
warned the Chinese against "aggressive or subversive
7ft

!

Ibid., pp. 333-334.

77

Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Why We Went
to War in Korea,"
Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951.

adventures beyond their borders."
the year, Secretary Acheson,

7ft

However, earlier in

in discussing the situation

in the Far East, had specifically excluded South Korea as
an area to be protected by the United States.

7ft

Thus, based

on State Department papers, the President could have justi
fiably chosen to withdraw entirely from Korea or to stand
and fight the aggressor.
By Monday, June 26th, it had become clear the attack
was in fact an all-out invasion and that the Republic of
South Korea could not survive without external assistance.
With the support of a Security Council resolution to the
effect that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace,
President Truman declared to his staff on the 26th of June
that
What was developing in Korea seemed to me
like a repetition on a larger scale of what
had happened in Berlin.
The Reds were probing
for weakness in our armory we had to meet their
thrust without getting embroiled in a world
wide war.®®'
7ft

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, March 27, 1950
pp. 467-472.
The speech was delivered in San Francisco, Calif
on March 15, 1950.
79

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXII, January 23,
1950, p. 116.
The speech by the Secretary of State was made
before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., on
January 12, 1950.
RO

Truman, II, 337.
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On the evening of the 26th of June,

instructions

were passed to General Douglas MacArthur to send all avail
able ammunition which could be spared to the South Korean
army and, in addition,

to furnish ships and planes for the

protection and evacuation of American dependents.-

This latter

requirement was naturally interpreted very liberally by the
General, who from the initiation of the first attack, advocated
direct American assistance.

The same directive

from Washington

started the Seventh Fleet north from the Philippines to take
up station in the Straits of Formosa for the purpose of
completely neutralizing Formosa and thereby preventing a
widening of the conflict.
By Wednesday,

81

the 28th of June,

the military situation

in Korea had further deteriorated to the point that General
MacArthur called the Pentagon advocating direct commitment
of two American divisions.

With the approval by Washington

of MacArthur1s plea for general force commitment under the
United Nations banner and the immediate authorization of a
naval blockade of North Korea,

82

the policy of containment con

currently became fully implemented in the Far East and passed
O1

Qp

Ibid., pp. 334-335.

Ibid., p. 343.
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from the passive to the active.
Although forced back by August into a small perimeter
around the port of Pusan on the south tip of the Korean penin
sula, General MacArthur on September 15th executed a "brilliant
maneuver," an invasion from the sea at Inchon, behind enemy
lines.

83

This maneuver turned the tide against the North

Koreans who by September 30th had hastily retreated north
to the 38th Parallel.

84

At this point in the war a further major policy
decision was in order:

should United Nations'

forces pursue

the war into North Korea with the aim of unifying all Korea
or was a standstill in order at the 38th Parallel,
whence the initial attack came?

from

The National Security

Council recommended the unification of all Korea and the
destruction of the army of North Korea, provided "there was
no indication of threat of entry of Sovde t or Chinese

Communists elements in force..."

QC

With the approval of

the President and with the support of the United Nations,
the forces of General MacArthur successfully moved into
83

Truman, II, 360.
The President so stated in a
message of congratulations to General MacArthur.
84

Rostow, p. 236.

fts
Truman,

II, p. 359.
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North Korea and approached the Yalu River by November,
1950.
contrary to the national intelligence estimate,
however,

in late November Red Chinese forces streamed into

North Korea from Manchurian bases,
suddenly took a turn for the worse.

and the Korean War
Secretary Acheson

remarked that
...This is not merely another phase of the
Korean campaign.
This is a fresh and unprovoked
aggressive act, even more immoral than the first.
By March of 1951 the see-saw affair was back again where
it all started,

and in April General MacArthur was removed

by the President for publicly advocating direct involvement
with Red China. 87

In the process of reaching a decision to

remove his subordinate,

the Commander-in-Chief reasoned that

...our Constitution embodies the principle of
civilian control of the military.
This was the
principle that General MacArthur threatened...
It was my duty to act.^®
The war then took on a stalemate condition at the 38th
Parallel which lasted through the truce negotiation phase, 89
and in fact the 38th Parallel ultimately became the line
86
87

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, p. 963.
Truman, II, pp. 442-449.

^ I b i d ., p. 445.

^Rostow, p. 236.
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of demarcation in Korea or the so-called Bamboo Curtain.
In retrospect
historical importance
highlighted.

there are several aspects

of

of the Korean War which need to be

First, the invasion was obviously specifically

designed to exploit a position of weakness,

a position

created by the previous year's withdrawl of American troops
and additionally by the general de-emphasis within the
Department of Defense
troops.

of the importance of Army ground

This latter concept envisioned a heavy reliance

oh American atomic bombers to maintain the peace.

90

However, the United States chose not to utilize h.er
bombers in their designed mission as atomic bomb carriers.
Instead,

the American atomic bombers were used only in the

more conventional role of dropping high explosive bombs,
and Communist forces chose not to employ heavy bombers at
all.

From this it may be concluded that both the Communists

and the United States felt either that the atomic bomb was
not required in Korea, or that its use would result in
retaliatory strikes by the opposition, or that its use
was immoral and might bring world censure.

90Ibid., pp. 228-230.
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Finally,

the American response, even though involv

ing less than full scale commitment of weapons, and even
though by the final settlement achieving only a stalemate
or status quo ante bellum, did represent a clear statement
and resolve by the United States to stop Communist aggression
in the Far East.

Secretary Acheson summarized the situation

as follows:
In Korea the Russians presented a check which
was drawn on the bank account of collective
security /containment in disguise/.
The
Russians thought the check would bounce.
They
thought it was a bad check.
But to their sur
prise, the teller paid i t . ^
Short term though.the Korean War may be considered,
it also had several important long terms results which
affected not only the Far East but the entire position of
the free world vis-a-vis Soviet Russia.

Success within the

United Nations Security Council during the crisis months of
June and July,

1950, was directly attributable to the

absence of the Soviet delegate and his veto power.

However,

his return in August clouded the future in regards to United
Nations responses in any future situation similar to the
Korean War.
91
p. 125.

Consequently orr September 20, 1950, Secretary

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXV, June 29, 1951,
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Acheson presented United States recommendations "designed
to increase the effectiveness of United Nations action
against aggression."

92

The Acheson Plan, as this was later

named, provided that if the Security Council failed to take
action to maintain international peace and security by
virtue of a veto, the General Assembly would "consider
the matter and make recommendations to members for collective
measures,

including force if necessary."

93

In June 1950, Congress authorized $5,000,000,000
for the defense of Europe.94

In 1951 Greece and Turkey

join .ed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Military

forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were
reinforced in 19 51 and 1952 by the direct commitment of
American divisions,

as General Eisenhower,

recalled from

Columbia University by President Truman as the first supreme
commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

sought

to strengthen the forces supporting the policy of contain
ment.

Serious thought was given to rearming Western Germany

itself.9 ^
92

^
Bundy, p. 255.

94
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Ibid.

Norman A. Graebner, "Dean G. Acheson," An Uncertain
Tradition, (ed.) Norman A. Graebner (New York:
McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 267-288.
9 ^Rostow, p. 217-258.
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Service forces in the United States were increased from
1,500,000 to 3,500,000 and have since been maintained at
about the,3,000,000 level.

The military budget rose from

$12,000,000,000 annually to $41,000,000,000 and also has
since leveled off at about the same figure.

Finally,

foreign aid rose from $4,500,000,000 annually to
$7,100,000,000, but has since tapered off into the
$3,000,000,000 category.

96

In short, Korea positively convinced American
leaders of the long term threat posed by Communism,and
acted as a catylst in the implementation of further longrange manpower and monetary tactics designed to stop the
Sino-Soviet Bloc on its existing borders.
96

F. R. Dulles, p. 259.

Also, Rostow, pp. 235-236.
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CHAPTER III
THE U. S. POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

The Eisenhower Republicans alleged during the
presidential campaign of 1952 that the Democrats had failed
to concoct a positive foreign policy vis-a-vis Soviet Russia
since World War II.

In contrast, General Eisenhower and his

future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, promised to
move from the negative or defensive to the positive or
offensive policy and concurrently .to balance the federal
1
budget.
On taking office, however, President Eisenhower
found that the issue of a peace or truce in Korea was still
the predominant issue in foreign affairs and that its
successful conclusion was prerequisite to concentration on
foreign affairs elsewhere.

2

In an effort to force the North Korean and Chinese
representatives to the United Nations
1
Eisenhower, pp. 127-130.
2

mediation table in

Also, Rostow, pp.' 301-304

C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift, " Fortune,
March, 1965, p. 112 . Hereafter referred to as Murphy.
According to McGeorge Bundy, Murphy and William Donovan were
privy to official government papers not available to other
writers, hence can be considered most authoritative.

Seoul, the United States under its new president quickly
enlarged the standing army in South Korea from twelve to
sixteen divisions and removed the Seventh Fleet shield
from the Straits of Formosa.3

Both of these actions were

taken with the objective in mind of causing Red China to
augment its trained manpower in the two critical areas.
Hopefully,

these tactics would make a peace in Korea more

desirable than ever before for the Communists.

In addition,

Secretary of State Dulles resorted to a maneuver later to be
known as the "brinkmanship" tactic when he used the "thinly
veiled threat" of a retaliatory atomic bomb attack if the
Chinese persisted in ignoring and boycotting truce negotia'
4
tions.

Although the president exercised extreme restraint

and was quite concerned that the threat might alienate our
allies as well as the neutrals of the world,

it did prove

effective at a time when the United States enjoyed.a clear
thermonuclear weapon advantage.

By June of 1953, the State

Department had both the truce negotiations with China and fiery
President Rhee of South Korea under control to the extent
that there was little danger of further escalation of the

3Ibid., p. 230.
^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York:
Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1-961), p. 98.
See also Peeters,
pp. 18-19.
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5
conflict in Korea.
The two major powers, the United States and the
Soviet

Union

viewed the results of the Korean conflict in

completely different w a y s .

Russia became convinced that

military aggression could not succeed against the power of
containment enhanced by indigenous troops armed under the
auspices and bached by the nuclear power of the United States.
Therefore, her thoughts and efforts turned for the moment
toward ideological conflict and diplomatic maneuvering.
Perhaps parodoxically, the United States felt that an
enhanced military capability and defense pacts with rimland
free nations would continue to be the most effective way to
contain Communism.

6

With Korea under control,

the new administration put

renewed emphasis on a second major objective, that of
extending the "system of alliances" around the "periphery of
7
the Iron Curtain. "

In the Pacific theater, the Truman

Administration had already completed a security treaty with
5
Adams, pp. 99-102.
"Escalation" is a journalistic
invention of recent vintage which means "the introduction of
more destructive weapons or more troops in a conflict."
6

Rostow, p. 325.

7
Eisenhower, pp. 446-447.
Both political parties m
the presidential election of 1952 had advocated the continuance
of American leadership of the free world and the policy of
collective security.
See R. F. Foster, pp. 266-267.
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Japan which included the use of certain Japanese bases.
Similarly, a bilateral treaty with the Philippines was
already in effect, as was the pact with Australia and
New Zealand, popularly known as ANZUS.

In September 1954,

Secretary Dulles extended the ANZUS pact to include Britain>
France, the Philippines,

Pakistan,

and Thailand and called

the new organization the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,
known popularly as SEATO, the Pacific guardian organization
against Communist aggression.

8

In Europe and indeed in the United States itself
there had been much opposition to the Korean War on the
grounds that it could easily lead to a general war in Asia,
when in fact the important area which deserved primary
focus of interest should be Europe.

9

To placate those

persons with such opinions, a European Defense Community
pact was signed in May 1952 which brought West Germany into
the Brussels Pact family for defensive purposes.

In return

for her partial sovereignty, Germany was to contribute 500,000
men for the common defense of Europe

10

In addition, the

United States received permission in 1953 for the use of
9

8
Reitzel, pp. 311-312.
10

Spanier, p. 64

Ibid., p . 283.
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military bases in Spain which would ultimately be utilized
as forward bases for strategic bombers and nuclear
11
submarines.

In the Middle East, the Truman administration had
successfully brought Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in March,

1952.

Secretary Dulles took up

the project where Secretary Acheson had left o f f . ‘ He
extended it to the eastern extremity of the Southeast Treaty
Organization with the conclusion of a defense pact in March
1955, supported by the United States, which included Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.

12

Of even greater importance than the enhancement of
the collective security concept on the rimland was the
direct security of the United States, because economically, .
politically, and militarily,

the United States represented

the heart and soul of resistance to Communism and as such
13
its defense was the sine qua n o n .

Recognizing this, the

Eisenhower administration proceeded to put its military
11

Reitzel,' p. 310-311.

12

Ibid. See Appendix D for a graphic display of the
aggregate of collective security organizations and defense
pacts on the Soviet periphery.
13 ■
Reitzel, p. 336.

forces in order and to establish planning objectives for the
future.

An early analysis of the status of rearmament within

the three services revealed that the Air Force was planning
its strategy and forces for a nuclear war, while the Army
14
and Navy were concentrating efforts on non-nuclear forces.
After several exhaustive studies regarding roles
and missions and military commitments, basically two alter
native plans evolved.

Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a strategic mobile
reserve of army power,

supported by naval and air power.

Secretary Dulles supported the alternative viewpoint,
developed within the National Security Council, that United
States' retaliation should rely primarily on atomic weapons
with minimum emphasis on ground army power.

15

This posi

tion of the National Security Council was undoubtedly influ
enced by a study performed by a retired Brigadier General,
Robert Cutler, who headed a team of distinguished former
military and civilian authorities.

Cutler later recalled

that in reaching a decision on the matter, that
14
15

Adams, p . 398.

Rostow, p. 305 and p. 249.
See also Paul Y.
Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1961), p. 365.
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The President's thinking was from the beginning
heavily influenced by concern that any serious
prolongation of the huge military programs of
the kind then underway and in contemplation must
inevitably turn the U. S. into a garrison state
...Before his inaugeration and later....the
considerations that controlled the President's
judgment were, first, the working up of a strategy
for the "long haul" that would be within the
nation's capacity to pay and, second, a defensive
and retaliatory power of such overawing strength
as to deter the possibility of attack upon this
country.
The President further emphasized that expenditures for
military preparedness should remain within the boundary
established by a balanced national budget when he said in
his State-of-the-Union message of February 2, 1953, that
"Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength
within the limits of endurable strain...."

17

Faced with

■

the dilemma of several alternative military strategies as
championed by the respective services, yet desirous of
balancing the budget, President Eisenhower "cleared away
some of .../the/ underbrush by ordering the Pentagon to
assume that if we got into war it would be fought with
nuclear weapons."

18

There followed several speeches on the part of
Secretary Dulles in bringing this policy to maturity.

March,

16C. J. V. Murphy,
1965.
17

Ibid.

In

"The Eisenhower Shift, " Fortune,
18

Adams, p. 398.
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June of 1953/ he announced to the cabinet that
Our deterrent, against the Russians.. .was a
retaliatory striking force that could be
launched quickly from bases near the enemy
and this meant that the United States must
maintain such bases on foreign soil in
various distant parts of the world....19
The world was officially informed in detail of the
American policy of massive retaliation by the Secretary's
speech on the night of January 12, 1954, to the Council of
Foreign Relations in New York City:
The way...is to place more reliance upon community
deterrent power, and less dependence upon local
defensive power...Local defense must be reinforced
by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory
power....The way to deter aggression is for the
free community to be willing and able to respond
vigorously at places and with means of its own
choosing.2 0
As initially defined, the new policy therefore consisted of
a rimland solidly allied with the United States and charged
with the task of maintaining local army forces but backed by
the airpower of the United States,

standing ready to respond

19 Ibid., pp. 103. Mr. Adams was paraphrasing from
notes taken at the cabinet meeting.
^ The New York Times, January 13, 1954.
The
President's State of the Union Speech on January 7, 1954, had
alluded to the new doctrine:
"We...will maintain a massive
capability to strike b a c k . " See Robert J. Donovan,
Eisenhower:
The Inside Story (New York:
Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1956), p. 326.
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instantly with atomic weapons.

The local forces became

known as the Shield, while the retaliatory nuclear forces
became known as the Sword.2.1
Dulles extolled the virtues of the new policy by
citing its success in bringing the Korean truce negotiations
to final settlement.
Korea/ is this:
lead us to fight,

He concluded that "The lesson /of

If events are likely which will in fact
let us make clear our intention in

advance; then we shall probably not have to fight."22

In

April 1954, Secretary Dulles also cited the policy's success
in keeping Red China from intervening in Indo-China; 23
however, with the loss of North Vietnam by the French at

/'

Dien Ben Phu the exclusion of Red China from Vietnam must
have been a hollow victory at best.
In spite of the Secretary's

enthusiasm for the

policy, the ominous spectre of Soviet equality

in

^Abshire, David M. and Allen, Richard V. (ed's),
National Security (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
1963), p. 278.
See also Rostow, p. 306.
^ State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, September 14,
1953, p. 339.
Secretary Dulles delivered the speech to the
American Legion in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 2, 1953.
23John pm Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace, "
Foreign Affairs, April, 1954, pp. 3 53-364.
A third accom
plishment of the "New Look" was the reduction of manpower
in the services from 3.2 million in
early 1955 to2.85
million by June 1956.
See Donovan, p. 326.
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thermonuclear technology appeared on the free world's
horizon in the summer of 1953 when Russia exploded its
24
first high yield weapon.
Admittedly, the Soviets did
not at the time or .even in early 1954 have a means or
system for the delivery of such a weapon, such as a bomber
or a missile, but even her first successful test caused •
jitters in the free community and a rather immediate modifi
cation of the basic precepts of American massive retaliatory
policies.

In April 1954 Secretary Dulles announced that

massive retaliation
,j_.may not have__the same significance forever.
/The free world/...must not put itself in the
position where the only response open to it is
general war.
/Required is/...a system in which
local defensive strength is reinforced by more
mobile deterrent power.
The method of doing so
will vary according to the character of the
various areas...That does not mean turning
every local war into a world war. .’.The point is
that a prospective attacker is not likely to
invade if he believes the pro^gble hurt will
outbalance the probable gain.
While the State Department was thus conceiving and
later modifying the massive retaliatory policy in the effort
26
to more emphatically contain Communism,
the Soviets were
24
25

Adams, p . 109.
J. F. Dulles, Foreign Affairs, April,

26
Adams, p. 87.

1954.

concurrently adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards
the United States.

27

The death of Premier Stalin in 1953

and the subsequent fight within the Kremlin for succession
undoubtedly contributed to the lack of Russian activity on
the international scene between 1953 and mid-1955.

Certainly

the Soviet leaders wanted time to perfect an inter-continental
ballistic missile and initiate deployment of these weapons
with nuclear warheads prior to any further serious confron
tation with the United States.

Last but not least in

causing this lull in American-Soviet confrontations in the
period was the system of defense pacts newly created and
now literally surrounding the Sino-Soviet Bloc except across
the northern tier.

28

By the middle of 1955 the lull had

convinced American leaders that there was no immediate
threat of a general nuclear war with Russia although the
accidental war or the limited war were always recognized as
possibilities which required constant attention.

This

reasoning also recognized that the Soviet threat required
analysis as to outcome and effect over the long-duration
period,

29

including not only military and technological

considerations, but economic and social as well.
27

28
Rostow, p. 32 5.

Ibid.

While thus

Also pp. 281-292.

exploring means to develop and/or maintain close rapport
with allied nations and seeking for the first time to
seriously compete with Communism for the favor of undeveloped
new nations, the policy of massive retaliation came apart at
the seams.

These other nations began to see the unilateral

aspects of the American retaliatory policy and could not
bring themselves to believe that it would actually be invoked
against similarly potent Soviet Russia.

Nor could they

morally condone its use except in a situation which necessi
tated nuclear response to a Soviet pre-emptive attack and
only then after consultation with the entire free-world
community rather than on the existing unilateral basis.^0
Although Secretary Dulles initially defended his unilateral
policy, popularly referred to as brinkmanship,

O1

in October,

1957, he further modified his basic policy by saying
10

Ibid., pp. 322-323, p. 350, and p. 444.
General
Eisenhower, as Commander of NATO in 1953 h a d .already faced
this same problem of resentment among our European allies
for not having access to atomic secrets and weapons.
See
Rostow, p. 319.
31Adams, p. 118.
In an interview with James Shepley
of Life and Time, Sec. Dulles said that "Some say that we
were brought to the verge of war /in threatening to enlarge
the Korean War, on the Indo-China situation, and on the ques
tion of Formosa/....We walked to the brink and we looked it
in the face. We took strong action....0 "
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In the future it may thus be feasible to place
less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory
power.
It may be possible to defend countries by
nuclear weapons so mobile /tactical weapon/7, or
so placed as to mate military invasion with
conventional forces a hazardous attempt.32
So ended the clear-cut American policy of massive
retaliation.

In retrospect it is rather ironic that the

policy was actually valid between about 1945 and 1950 when
the United States in fact had an atomic monopoly, and had not
publicly suggested that it might be used; yet when formally
announced to the world in 1954,

it was no longer valid. J

SUMMIT TALKS AND CONFRONTATIONS

The less-aggressive Soviet policy of 1953-1956 gave
promise that the problems posed by bipolarization might be
solved through the use of meetings among .the heads of state
of major powers in the world.

Churchill had suggested such

a meeting immediately after the death of Stalin in 1953, but
to no avail.

However, by 1955 the political climate had

3?

J John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in
United States Policy," Foreign Affairs, October, 1957, p. 31.
JJDean G. Acheson, "The Premises of American Policy, "
American Strategy for the Nuclear A g e , ed's. Walter C. Hahn
and John C. Neff (Garden City:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960),
p. 416.

mellowed to the point that direct negotiations seemed
possible.

The first such meeting of heads of state

convened on July 16, 1955, at Geneva.

President Eisenhower

represented the United States and formally proposed that the
group,

including Great Britain, France, and the Soviet

Union, accept an "Open Skies" concept, whereby each nation
would exchange basic data regarding military installations
with the others and additionally be permitted aerial
reconnaissance of military areas for inspection purposes. 34
Nothing productive was forthcoming from Geneva.
Union maintained her Iron Curtain.

The Soviet

George Kennan later

wrote that the meeting at Geneva failed because "no intimacy
of understanding is really possible," since the Russians
refuse to look at the facts with any degree of "objectivity."3 5
In the period of two or three years following
Geneva, there occurred several new confrontations between
the United States and Soviet Russia on the rimlahd with the
balance of thermonuclear power still favoring the Americans
but by a margin quite unclear.

Soviet Russia took advantage

^Eisenhower, pp. 505-511.
See Reitzel, pp. 400-401
for a summary of events leading up to the Summit meeting.
Also, Donovan, p. 344.
35

Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, pp. 20-27<>
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of the uncertainty to employ the threat of her own retaliation
on several occasions.
The first such confrontation occurred over the Suez
Crisis which resulted from British and French efforts to
depose Nasser and counter-mand Egypt's nationalization of
36
the Suez Canal.

The report on October 31, 1956, that

British aircraft from Cyprus had bombed Egypt was a complete
37
surprise to President Eisenhower.
Soviet leaders
threatened military reprisals against Western Europe,
implying the use of missiles.

At the expense of the loss of

considerable prestige within the ranks of her allies, the
United States

"joined the Russians and the Arab-Asian Block

in raising the hue and cry against its friends."

38

With the

realization 'that their efforts against Egypt were being
opposed both by the Soviet and American governments, no
alternative remained open to England and France except a ■
cease-fire.

As a result of the cease-fire, Premier Nasser's
39
pro-Communist regime in Egypt remained intact.
36

Dean G. Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 110-116.,
37
Adams, p. 2 55. Also, Public Papers of the
President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956.
(U. S. Printing Office, 1958), p. 282.
38

Acheson, pp. 110-116.
and Rostow, pp. 3 58-3 59.
39

Ibid.

Also, see Adams, p. 257,
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Virtually concurrent with the Suez Crisis was the
Hungarian revolt which was initiated on October 23, 1956.
Even though this was apparently more of an internal affair
for Soviet Russia than the Suez Crisis,

Soviet leaders made

it clear that no outside interference would be permitted.
Even though the ill-fated Hungarian revolutionary force made
repeated requests by radio for Allied assistance, no assistance
was permitted,

and the revolt collapsed when revolutionary

forces were attacked by Soviet tanks on November 4 t h . ^
In a diplomatic move designed to stop Nasser in the
Middle East and also to enforce the containment policy
against Communism in the same area, President Eisenhower
announced a new policy on January 5, 1957, which became
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

It proposed

...that the U. S. ...cooperate with and
assist any nation...of the Middle East in the
development of economic strength dedicated to
the maintenance of national independence...
/to include/ military assistance.. ./and/...
employment of the armed forces of the United
States... against overt armed aggression from
any nation controlled by International
Commun i sm.^

^ A d a m s , p. 2 57.
41 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 12-13. Anthony Eden,
British Prime Minister during the Suez Crisis, said that
the Eisenhower Doctrine "helped to show that the West was
not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltration
and subversion by others."
See Anthony Eden, The Memoirs
of Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1960), p. 646.
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In April,

1957, when Jordan requested assistance

under the terms of the new doctrine, the United States
responded by dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the eastern
Mediterranean and by providing Jordan $10,000,000 for her
army and economy.
temporary relief.

But these steps provided only
In July of 1958, the internal situation

in both Jordan and Lebanon deteriorated to the point where
direct intervention was required.

British paratroopers

landed in Jordan and 14,000 American soldiers were landed
by naval vessels on the shores of Lebanon.^3

soviet veiled

threats to use ballistic missiles notwithstanding,^ the
stability of the governments of Jordan and Lebanon was
preserved and eventually in October, 1958, Allied troops
were withdrawn.^5
In 1959 the crisis scene shifted to Germany, with the
Soviet Union again demanding Allied withdrawal from Berlin.
Kruschev's announcement to the press said that
If the Western powers disagree with our proposals,
that will not stop us. When the time /of six
months7 expires, we will imglement our proposals
as stated in our documents.

42Adams, p. 289.

43Bailey, p. 851.

^^Hans Speier, Divided Berlin, The Anatomy of Soviet
Political Blackmail (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger,
Publisher, 1960), pp. 28-29.
45Bailey, p. 851.

^Speier, p. 35.
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On June 23, 1959, he announced to the United States that
Your generals talk of maintaining your position
in Berlin by force.
That is bluff.
If you
47
want war...our rockets will fly automatically.
Although Mr. Krushchev's threats came to naught as the
deadline passed, his remarks ushered in the international
condition which still confronts us today - the balance of
terror.

THE BALANCE OF TERROR''

President Truman said before departing from the
White House in 1953:

"The war of the future would be one

in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one
blo w . ..Such a war is not a possible policy for rational
men."

48

His nucleomitophobia,

or fear of atomic attack,

49

undoubtedly stemmed from his study of the probable effects
of nuclear weapons in a general war.

In order to under

stand even to a small degree what the balance of terror
really means,

it is important to understand the probable

effects of thermonuclear bombs.
47

For instance, the

Ibid., p . 30.

48

State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, January
19, 1953, p. 94.
49

York:

Arthur Herzog, The War Peace Establishment
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 263.

(New
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radiation effects alone of a one megaton thermonuclear bomb
equal that of about one million tons of radium.

50

addition to the fallout effect of such radiation,

In
a

population must contend with blast, thermal effects, and
secondary fires.

One of the leading experts on this

subject, Herman Kahn, has estimated that if Soviet Russia
launched a nuclear attack against American urban-industrial
complexes, between 75 percent and 100 percent of the
51
population would be killed.
Soviet Major General N.
Talensky said basically the same thing in 1960:
...nuclear war would mean that human society
would be set back and that the road to
Communism would be immeasurably lengthened.
A second major point to be understood even before
defining the balance in terror is the correlation between
the physical size of a nation and the degree to which its
citizens suffer from nucleomitophobia.

It was almost

unnecessary for Soviet Marshal Vasilevsky to inform the
British that
50

Hahn and Neff, p. 2 57.
Figures are derived from
a U. S. government document, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.
51

Herman Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable
Horizon Press, 1962), p. 61.
52

(New York:

Speier, pp. 44-45, quoting from Soviet Magazine,
International Affairs.
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. ...atomic and hydrogen bombs . . .are particularly
dangerous for countries with a small territory
and a large population.53
What this really means is that all things being equal, the
balance of power tends to favor the nation whose population
and industrial capacities are spread out over the largest
a rea.
With the break in the American monopoly on
thermonuclear weapon technology and the means of delivery
in the late 1950's, the Free World was faced with a
situation that offered at best only equality with Communism.
This fact has, of necessity, dominated all decisions since
that time which were related to national security, including
foreign policy with Soviet Russia.

This balanced condition

constitutes considerably more than merely the capability for
each of the two societies to launch massive nuclear attacks
against each other, and although the balance is related to
and affected by respective defensive environments,

it is to

a much greater degree related to the deterrent capability of
55
each of the adversaries.
"To deter an attack means being
53

Acheson, p. 100, quoting from Pravda, December 4,

1954.
54

Reitzel, pp. 327-329.

55Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punish
ment (Princeton University Center of International Studies,
1959), p. 43.

54
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able to strike back in spite of it.

A balance of

terror exists when each side has such a capability to
strike second and still inflict unacceptable damage on the
other side.

57

A more finite description has been provided

by Herman Kahn who reasons as follows:
all of its missiles,

for example,

If Country A fires

2000, at Country JB's 1020

missile sites, he will destroy perhaps 1000 of them, but
subsequently Country 13 will launch its remaining 2 0 at
Country A and kill 20 percent of Country A's population.
Under such conditions even a pre-emptive or surprise attack
becomes the worst possible national strategic alternative.
Our rimland allies, particularly in industrial Europe,
have recognized the sterility of the nuclear retaliatory
policy vis-a-vis Communist aggression.; yet they still recog
nize its necessity as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear
capability.

However,

since the balance of terror greatly

-^Albert Wolhstetter, "The Delicate Balance of
Terror," American Strategy for the Nuclear A g e , (ed's),
Walter C. Hahn and John C. Neff (Garden City:
Doubleday &
Co., Inc., 1960), p. 199.

^

Snyder, p. 97.

^ K l a u s , Knorr and Thornton Read (ed's.), Limited
Strategic War (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
1962), p. 48, quoting Herman Kahn's essay, "Some Comments
on Controlled W a r . "

reduces the probability of employment of nuclear power, the
defense against other forms of armed aggression becomes a
more serious problem.
American security planning has also taken this
conclusion into account.

As early as 1955, the then Army

Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor, began to prepare United
States Army forces for limited ground wars in support of
national objectives as a substitute for the unappliable
59
force of the atom.
Unfortunately, the requirement for the graduated
response or limited war capability has not lessened the
requirement for the technique or situation known as
nuclear umbrella,

for it remains the sine qua n o n .

a viable and credible nuclear deterrence,

Maintaining

capable of response

even after being attacked by the. enemy, requires excellence
in nuclear technology and weapon systems 1 survivability
against enemy defenses.

A continuing, major effort by the

American populace is required in the future to assure a
"strike second" deterrence second to none.
59

Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York:
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), pp. 130-180.
See
also Rostow, p. 322, Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the W e s t ,
p. 56, and James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), pp. 92-17 7.
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CONCLUSIONS

Bipolarization of world power between 1945 and 1947
and the ensuing Cold War caused the pendulum of American
foreign policy with the Soviet Union to swing from the
wartime alliance to one advocating containment on the rimland
backed by the threat of nuclear power.

Soviet postwar

objectives to eliminate American influence from Japan and
Europe and to implant Communism in the Middle East, Southeast
Asia, and Africa*^ had been thwarted by Free World policies
which had established collective security on the rimland from
the 38th Parallel in Korea, to Formosa, to Southeast Asia, to
the Baghdad Pact, and finally to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
In 1953 as equilibrium was reached in nuclear tech
nology,

the pendulum moved back a little towards the center

with the establishment of a mutual suicide pact or balance of
terror.

This balance placed prime emphasis in both camps

on obtaining the favor of uncommitted and undeveloped new
nations who because of the courting by the two competitors
could afford to be quite demanding in playing one against
60

Rostow, pp. 261-262
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the other.

Some American leaders found it difficult to

condone the sometimes indifferent,

sometimes arrogant

attitude displayed by the recipients of the $3,000,000,000
annual outlay of aid funds.
by necessity,

"1

Yet the courting continued,

for it was recognized that marriage with

uncommitted nations could be decisive in determining the
/*q

eventual outcome of the East-West struggle.

This

conclusion takes on increased significance as additional
nations become technically capable of producing and
delivering thermonuclear weapons.
Concurrent with Soviet parity in nuclear technology
was the rapid expansion of her industrial capability.
Although a true balance does not yet exist,

she is admittedly

second only to the United States and should she be capable of
integrating all Communist economic might into a commonwealth,
her market wouldx be even larger than the combined North
American and Western European markets. 6 3

York:

^ H e r b e r t Feins, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy
St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 55.
^Reitzel, p. 317.

(New

See also Baruch, pp. 409-410.

^ I s a a c Deutscher, The Great Conflict (Oxford
University Press, 1960), pp. 50-51.
See also Kennan, Russia,
the Atom and the West, p. 2.
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Soviet advances in technology were emphasized by
initial leadership in space activities.

On October 4, 1957,

the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial
satellite vehicle.

Sputnik I. 64

In the race to gain the

favor of uncommitted and undeveloped nations, the publicity
and prestige associated with such a feat produced marked
effects.

The United States respect for the threat posed by

Soviet technology increased considerably0

President Eisenhower

took action to accelerate dispersal programs for Strategic Air
Command bombers,
devices,

sought improved and longer range warning

initiated research for a defense against missiles,

and approved additional long-range missiles for the United
States arsenal.

65

In the same speech which announced improvements in
the American arsenal, President Eisenhower told of American
reaction to Sputnik as follows:
. .aWe know of their /.Soviet/ vigorous education
system and their technological achievements...
When such competence in things material is at the
service of leaders who have so little regard for
^ M a r t i n Caidin, Overture to Space
Sloan and Pearce, 1963), p. 122.

(New York:

Duell,

^^State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, December 2,
1957, pp. 867-871.
The President made the speech at Oklahoma
City on November 13th0
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things human, and who command the power of an empire,
there is danger ahead for free men everywhere.
That,
my friends, is the reason why the American people
have been so aroused about the earth satellite...The
world will witness future discoveries even more
startling than that of nuclear fission.
The question
is: Will we be the ones to make t h e m ? ^
Concurrently,

the President requested increased endeavors

on the part of American scientists to place our own satellite in
orbit .^
1958,

When this was successfully accomplished on January 31,
the Space Race, as an adjunct to the Cold War, was

officially underway.
The Soviet industrial growth and technological develop
ment has enforced the deterrent value of American strike-second
capabilities, because now the Soviet leaders have come to regard
their industrial base as their prized possession.

Whereas in

World War II, Stalin could afford to somewhat disregard popula
tion losses, today's leaders cannot disregard the possibilities
of the loss of the industrial base.
Finally, by 1959 the United States had recognized that
the balance of terror demanded other military alternatives in
addition to nuclear response and consequently had initiated a
build-up of limited war forces.

^ Ibido
67Ibid.
68

Caidin, p. 274.

She also had recognized that

90

the cold war problem embraced not only military strategy,
but the entire gamut of political,

scientific

(including

competition in space), and ideological strategies as well.
As Herman Kahn has so aptly written:
Clemenceau:
'War is too important to be left
to the generals.'
A. Wohlstetter:
'Peace is too important to be
left to the generals.*69
69

Kahn, Thinking the Unthinkable, p. 32.
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL DEFENSE, FOREIGN AID AND
MILITARY AID EXPENDITURES
1946-1955
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, 1947 PRICES)

GNP

^

NATIONAL
DEFENSE

MILITARY
AID

FOREK
AID

1946

233 .8

21.2

.07

6.0

1947

232 .2

12 .2

.04

6.6

1948

243 .9

11.2

.3

4.6

1949

241.5

12 .8

.2

5.7

1950

264.7

12 .7

.5

3 .8

1951

282 .9

27.0

1.5

2.6

1952

293 .3

36.8

2.6

1.8

1953.

306.5

38.9

4.3

1.2

1954

300.5

32.4

3.1

.9

1955

318.8

29.8

2 .2

1.5

AUTHORITY:

Reitzel et al, pp. 379 and 481, quoting from
data of U. S. Department of Commerce, "Survey
of Current Business."
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